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Review of The Origins of Behavioural Public Policy, by Adam Oliver.
Adam Oliver has written an introduction to behavioural public policy, targeted at 
both students and laypersons. Oliver is a behavioural economist—much of his research 
has involved applying behavioural economics to the domain of health and healthcare—
and he sees behavioural public policy through this lens. Economics starts with a model of 
a rational agent. However, there is plenty of evidence that people violate the economic 
assumptions of rationality in systematic and predictable ways. People use heuristics, or 
mental shortcuts, which evolved because they are fast and efficient ways of making 
decisions, giving our ancestors an advantage in the Pleistocene. However, when applied to 
the decisions we make in modern life, they sometimes lead to ‘biases’, or systematic 
deviations from the rational choice model. For a behavioural economist, behavioural 
public policy is about acknowledging these biases and therefore going beyond the 
traditional economic tools of regulation and pricing (i.e. taxes and subsidies).
Accordingly,  Oliver starts by setting out the traditional rationality assumptions that 
are made by economists and the evidence that humans violate them. The basic set-up has 
an individual agent who is choosing between risky ‘lotteries’, i.e. it is not necessarily 
certain what outcome will result from her choice. Expected utility theory specifies a small 
set of intuitively plausible axioms that constrain the form of the agent’s preferences over 
these lotteries. The seminal contribution made by von Neumann and Morgenstern (1947) 
was to show how an agent who satisfies these axioms can be mathematically modelled as 
maximizing a cardinal utility function: roughly speaking, rational agents choose the action 
that will give them the greatest possible subjective value from the outcomes, taking into 
account the probability that each outcome occurs. The expected utility theory framework 
allows economists to build mathematically tractable models from fairly parsimonious 
assumptions. From the beginning, it was ambiguous whether expected utility theory was 
supposed to be a descriptive model of behaviour or a normative model of the choices that 
a rational agent would take, and it is sometimes also called rational choice theory. 
Oliver presents a number of ‘paradoxes’ of rationality, which are really patterns of 
choices or behaviours that are puzzling for expected utility theory because they imply that 
people do not obey the axioms. He covers the classic examples, such as the ‘Allais 
Paradox’, where people seem to place a special value on certainty, disliking risk when 
certainty is an option, and ‘preference reversals’, where, when asked to choose between 
two lotteries x and y, people say that they would prefer to have x but, when asked to place 
monetary values on the lotteries, they place a higher value on y than x.  In the following 
chapter, Oliver presents the main descriptive theories that aim to accommodate these 
findings. Then there three chapters on specific topics that challenge economic ideas about 
rationality. The first is on intertemporal decision-making. When making choices with 
outcomes that may be realised in the future, it may be rational to weight sooner outcomes 
more than later ones because, the further in the future the outcomes are realised, the less 
certain it is that one will actually get them. However, people display a ‘present-bias’. They 
attach a particularly heavy weight to the present, which implies that if they have to make a 
choice now with an outcome that will be realised in the future, then they might reverse 
that choice if allowed to reconsider when the time comes. Second, Oliver covers the gestalt 
effects of experiences, where we value wholes differently from the sum of their parts. 
When evaluating an experience, we place an emphasis on the peak of the experience (high 
or low point) and the end moment. This implies that, if we take a painful experience, we 
can improve our evaluation of the experience if we add on an extra period of pain, 
providing that the extra pain is slightly less painful than the previous end moment. 
Paradoxically, more pain (as measured by summing across time periods) may be preferred 
to less. Finally, Oliver covers evidence that people’s attitudes to incentives are different 
from those assumed by economics. Prices and fines can have perverse effects, for instance 
payment for blood leading to less being collected, or a fine for late pick-ups at nursery 
leading to parents arriving even later.
This part of the book is basically an exposition of relevant concepts from 
behavioural economics, whose relevance is demonstrated through policy examples, 
predominantly from healthcare. I found the material really clear—I especially liked that 
Oliver managed to explain and use the Marshak-Machina triangle—although obviously 
I’m not best placed to judge comprehensibility for the target audience. This material leads 
into discussion of non-standard policy interventions, or nudges, where Oliver draws on 
his own research, applying a framework that he developed to classify various policy 
examples and using it to critique the theoretical foundations of nudge.
Oliver presents the following five requirements for an intervention to be a ‘nudge’, 
which he says are derived from Thaler and Sunstein (2003, 2008): the intervention must 
rely on automatic decision processes, be liberty preserving, not use large financial 
incentives, be informed by behavioural economics; and target internalities (in other words 
they are supposed to have beneficial effects for the decision-maker herself, rather than 
beneficial effects on others, as in the classic ‘externalities’ of economics). However, Thaler 
and Sunstein’s definition of a nudge is much more expansive than this: “A nudge, as we 
will use the term, is any aspect of the choice architecture that alters people's behavior in a 
predictable way without forbidding any options or significantly changing their economic 
incentives” (Thaler and Sunstein, 2008, p.6). I want to concentrate on two ways in which 
this definition differs from Oliver’s criteria.
I have a lot of sympathy for Oliver’s idea that nudges involve automatic processes, 
but that is not the position that Thaler and Sunstein (2008) take. Not only is his criteria 
more restrictive than their definition, but Sunstein (2016) has recently been investigating 
the public acceptability of automatic (‘System 1’) nudges, such as default rules, vs 
deliberative (‘System 2’), nudges, such as factual disclosures. One point in favour of 
Oliver’s requirement of automaticity is that it fixes the boundaries of nudge in the right 
place. Consider information campaigns. As Oliver points out, they are not generally 
considered to be nudges. However, some nudges, for instance traffic light labelling 
systems, clearly do impart information. What makes these interventions nudges when 
information campaigns are not? One possible answer is that information campaigns are 
designed to change minds via deliberation, whereas a traffic light system is designed to 
influence the automatic system. Where Sunstein (2016) talks of ‘System 1’ vs ‘System 2’ 
nudges, we might wonder if it makes more sense to talk of non-conscious vs conscious 
apprehension of how the nudge works, or even just ‘opaque’ vs ‘transparent’ nudges 
(Osman, Lin & Gold, in prep).
Oliver’s internality criterion is also more restrictive than Thaler and Sunstein’s 
(2008) definition because they do not rule out the possibility that nudges target 
externalities. For Oliver, targeting internalities rather than externalities is what makes an 
intervention a nudge rather than a ‘budge’.  So, for Oliver, changing the default so that 
people have to opt out of pension contributions is a nudge, while changing the default so 
that people have to opt out of organ donation is a budge. For Thaler and Sunstein, both 
would be nudges. (The third item in Oliver’s helpful framework is a ‘shove’, a regulatory 
intervention that uses behavioural economics in order to resolve internalities. His example 
is a smoking ban in public places, though I have to say that I don’t understand why this is 
a behavioural rather than a standard economic intervention.) Again, there is a rationale for 
the restriction. A lot of the debate around nudge focusses on ‘Libertarian paternalism’, or 
whether it is acceptable to nudge people for their own good. However, this discussion is 
not relevant to policies that are justified in terms of their externalities, i.e. Oliver’s budges.
There is a broader point that can be made here. A lot of intellectual ink has been 
spilled on the ethics of nudge, indeed I am guilty of spilling some of it myself (Osman, Lin 
& Gold, in prep). However, in policy applications, Libertarian paternalism may not be so 
relevant after all. This is not to say that policy makers do not worry about the ethics of 
nudge—they do—but that, in my opinion, most behavioural public policy interventions 
have externality elements to them. Many behavioural interventions are simply straight 
budges. Oliver gives the example of defaults for organ donation, but there are many 
others. For instance, the Behavioural Insights Team at Public Health England (no relation 
to the ‘nudge unit’ discussed in the book) is using behavioural insights to prevent anti-
microbial resistance, whereby over-using antibiotics now increases the speed at which they 
will stop working for other people in the future (Hallsworth et al., 2016). In the Treasury, 
there is a Behavioural Insights Unit, which uses behavioural interventions to get people to 
pay their taxes on time. In these cases, Libertarian paternalism does not apply. But even 
policy interventions that are not wholly budges often have an externality element to them. 
Of course, if we use behavioural insights to encourage people to attend their NHS health 
checks (Sallis et al., 2016; Sallis et al. in prep a; Sallis et al. in prep b), we want them to be 
healthier for its own sake. But when someone takes action in order to stay fit and well, 
there is also a positive externality (a benefit that does not accrue to the person taking the 
action) because they will need less healthcare in the long run therefore saving the NHS 
money (Department of Health, 2008). It may be easiest to see the externality by 
considering a health behaviour with a negative externality. One justification for the 
taxation of cigarettes is that they lead to illness, which places a burden on healthcare 
services. In countries with socialized medicine, such as the UK, this is funded from general 
taxation, so it is a cost that does not accrue to the person smoking the cigarette. 
Justifications deriving from cost effectiveness and externalities do not need to invoke 
Libertarian paternalism.
That strikes me as a good thing. There is a long tradition of justifying the state and 
its authority by appealing to the reciprocal benefits of providing public goods or social 
insurance. Behavioural public policies that have beneficial externalities can be justified 
within that framework. However, there is no concensus on whether the apparatus of the 
state may be used paternalistically on citizens.
This book could be called ‘Behavioural economics and public policy’. Oliver is open 
that his focus is on behavioural economics and the approach he takes to public policy is 
pretty standard for a behavioural economist. However, many practitioners of behavioural 
public policy think of it more broadly as ‘behavioural science and public policy’. This has 
several implications.
First, although behavioural economics has the limelight, other disciplines have been 
influential. As one health psychologist that I work with put it, ‘Kahneman won the Nobel 
prize for economics and suddenly we had all these people coming on our turf and telling 
us it was behavioural economics.’ Oliver gives a friendly critique of the Mindspace report, 
a tool which draws heavily on behavioural economics (Cabinet Office and Institute for 
Government, 2010). However, psychology had also recognised that there is an ‘intention-
behaviour gap’ (Sheeran, 2002), so that traditional policy interventions that are aimed at 
changing minds have at best moderate effects (Webb & Sheeran, 2006) and the discipline 
has therefore developed its own tools. To take Oliver’s preferred domain of health, there 
are tools such as  the Behaviour Change Wheel and the Theoretical Domains Framework 
(TDF), which are used to diagnose the cognitive, affective, social, and environmental 
influences on behaviour change (Michie, Atkins, & West, 2014; Michie et al, 2005; Cane et 
al, 2012). The tools from psychology put more emphasis on analyzing the situation, 
diagnosing the barriers to behaviour change, and matching interventions to barriers, 
compared to the Mindspace checklist of possible behavioural techniques. Sociologists are 
also in on the act, criticizing both psychology and economics for paying insufficient 
attention to institutional structures, leading to them to propose the Individual, Social and 
Material (ISM) tool, which has been used by the Scottish government (Darnton & Horne, 
2013). That leads to an issue of disciplinary translation. The TDF synthesises psychological 
theories of behaviour change that are relevant to implementation of new behaviours, 
identifying the constructs that are used in these theories and grouping them into domains. 
Health psychologists sometimes ask of the heuristics and biases approach ‘where is the 
theory?’. But, of course, in economics there is a theory of rational choice and then a 
catalogue of deviations from that theory, which arguably correspond to a suite of 
psychological mechanisms. As we go forwards, it will be important to develop ways of 
translating between the languages of different disciplines. 
Second, although people working in behavioural insights predominantly focus on 
changing choice architecture, they do not exclusively do that. They may also use 
traditional price instruments, for instance, behavioural teams have worked on alcohol and 
sugar taxation (Harper, Ravenscroft & Service, 2018) and on incentivising general 
practitioners to perform NHS health checks (Public Health England, 2018). Policies that 
use financial incentives to change behaviour are not what gives behavioural public policy 
its originality. However, the two approaches may not be so easy to disentangle. When an 
item is on sale, its price is decreased with the aim of increasing purchases. But being on 
sale may also make the item salient, having a similar effect through a non-rational avenue. 
We also know that, when a relative price changes, responses to the policy may depend on 
how the change is presented, for instance a cash discount is considered more acceptable 
than a credit card surcharge (Kahneman, Knetsch, & Thaler, 1991). (Some of these ideas are 
covered in Oliver’s chapter on motivation crowding.) So, although there is a rationale to 
Oliver’s focus on deviations from the rational actor model, one shouldn’t lose sight of the 
fact that the practice of behavioural public policy is broader than this.
Third, behavioural public policy takes methodology, as well as content, from 
behavioural science. One of the innovations, which Oliver does not emphasize, has been to 
run randomized controlled trials (in the language of economics, ‘field experiments’) to 
learn what policy interventions will be most effective (Haynes et al,  2012). The idea of 
evaluating policies is not new. However, in policy circles, the approach of using a control 
group in order to establish that an intervention caused a change in behaviour is novel. If, 
as well as giving an interevntion to a group, there is a closely matched control group, who 
do not receive the intervention, then we can deduce that any difference in behaviour 
between the two groups is due to the intervention. Without a control group, we cannot tell 
whether a change in behaviour is due to the intervention or to other external factors that 
may also have changed during the course of the evaluation.
Oliver is very circumspect in his presentation of the material. He is judicious in his 
criticism, not revealing his own views until the final chapter. In both the cases where 
Oliver deviates from Thaler and Sunstein, I would have preferred it if he had presented his 
criteria as critique, rather than clarification, of their position. In general, it is not hard to 
imagine that this book’s origins were a seminar series; it would be a very even-handed 
teaching aid. The flip side is that positions are often taken from the mouths of other 
authors, so the book can be a little ‘he said, she said’ at points. This is a shame because, 
when it comes through, Oliver’s narrative voice has a wonderful wry wit.
Oliver ends by speculating whether behavioural public policy will maintain such a 
high profile in the future; he guesses that it will not, as the publicity around it dies down. 
On this, I disagree with him. At least in policy circles, the influence of behavioural insights, 
understood as a broad spectrum of interventions that are based on behavioural science, is 
only increasing. Oliver reports the worry of some theorists that nudges are less effective at 
changing behaviour than traditional regulation (Loewenstein et al. 2012; Marteau et al, 
2011). While it is true that nudges generally do not bring about such large changes as 
regulations, they are cost effective and easy to implement. In an organization the size of 
the NHS, an eminently achievable 5% improvement in performance saves a lot of lives and 
a lot of money. For this sort of reason, there are many behavioural units across government 
and the private sector. Oliver focuses on the work of the Behavioural Insights Team or 
‘nudge unit’, which originated in the cabinet office but was spun off as a social purpose 
company. However, most government departments will have a behavioural unit; as do 
other public bodies, such as the Financial Conduct Authority; and private sector firms, 
such as consultancies and banks. So I don’t think behavioural insights is going away soon. 
Also, Oliver’s main focus is on the theoretical application of behavioural science to public 
policy. But the other innovation of behavioural public policy is a shift to more empirically 
informed policy-making, scientifically testing policy changes in a small area before rolling 
them out on a larger scale. Again, I expect that this approach is here to stay. All the more 
reason to read this book.
In his preface, Oliver says that he has not written a popular science book. 
Nevertheless, he has written a book that—as well as being informative—is immensely 
readable, and I highly recommend it.
Natalie Gold
References
Cabinet  Office  and Institute  for  Government  (2010)  MINDSPACE:  Influencing  behaviour 
through public policy. London: Cabinet Office and Institute for Government.
Cane,  J.,  O’Connor,  D.,  &  Michie,  S.  (2012).  Validation  of  the  theoretical  domains 
framework  for  use  in  behaviour  change  and  implementation  research.  Implementation 
science, 7(1), 37. 
Department of Health. (2008a). Putting prevention first vascular checks: risk assessment and 
management, impact assessment. London: Department of Health. 
Darnton, A. & Horne., J (2013) Influencing Behaviours. Edinburgh: Scottish Government. 
Felsen,  G.,  Castelo,  N.,  & Reiner,  P.  B.  (2013).  Decisional  enhancement  and autonomy: 
public attitudes towards overt and covert nudges. Judgment and Decision Making, 8(3), 
202. 10.1177/2332858416674007
Hallsworth, M., Chadborn, T., Sallis, A., Sanders, M., Berry, D., Greaves, F., Clements, L. & 
Davies, S. C. (2016). Provision of social norm feedback to high prescribers of antibiotics in 
general practice: a pragmatic national randomised controlled trial. The Lancet, 387(10029), 
1743-1752.
Haynes, L., Service, O., Goldacre, B., & Torgerson, D. (2012). Test, Learn, Adapt: 
Developing Public Policy with Randomised Controlled Trials. London: Cabinet Office.
Hugo Harper, Luke Ravenscroft and Owain Service (2018) Sugar tax: how will it affect 
behaviour? Available at http://www.behaviouralinsights.co.uk/health/behaviour-
change-and-the-new-sugar-tax/, accessed 12th March 2018.
Kahneman, D., Knetsch, J. L., & Thaler, R. H. (1991). Anomalies: The endowment effect, 
loss aversion, and status quo bias. Journal of Economic perspectives, 5(1), 193-206.
Loewenstein, G., Asch, D. A., Friedman, J. Y., Melichar, L. A., & Volpp, K. G. (2012). Can 
behavioural economics make us healthier?. BMJ: British Medical Journal (Online), 344:e3482.
Marteau, T. M., Ogilvie, D., Roland, M., Suhrcke, M., & Kelly, M. P. (2011). Judging 
nudging: can nudging improve population health?. BMJ: British Medical Journal (Online), 
342.
Michie, S., Johnston, M., Abraham, C., Lawton, R., Parker, D., & Walker, A. (2005). Making 
psychological theory useful for implementing evidence based practice: a consensus 
approach. BMJ Quality & Safety, 14(1), 26-33.
Michie, S., Atkins, L., & West, R. (2014). The behaviour change wheel: a guide to designing 
interventions. Needed: physician leaders, 26.
Neumann, J. von, and Morgenstern, O. (1947). Theory of Games and Economic Behavior, 
Second edition. Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press.
Osman, Lin & Gold (in prep) ‘What factors persuade the public on social policy 
interventions?
Public Health England (2018) NHS Health Check Commissioning: current and potential use 
of weighted financial remuneration. Available from www.healthcheck.nhs.uk
Sallis, A., Bunten, A., Bonus, A., James, A., Chadborn, T., & Berry, D. (2016). The 
effectiveness of an enhanced invitation letter on uptake of National Health Service Health 
Checks in primary care: a pragmatic quasi-randomised controlled trial. BMC family 
practice, 17(1), 35.
Sallis, A., Agbebiyi, A., James, R., Berry, D., Gold, N. & Bonus, A. (in prep a) Increasing 
uptake of National Health Service Health Checks in Primary Care:  A pragmatic 
randomised controlled trial of enhanced invitation letters in Northamptonshire, England.
Sallis, A., Sherlock, J., Bonus, A., Saei, A., Gold, N. &. Chadborn, T (in prep b) Increasing 
uptake of National Health Service Health Checks:  A factorial randomised controlled trial 
using theoretically informed letters and SMS pre-notification and reminder text messages.
Sheeran, P. (2002). Intention—behavior relations: a conceptual and empirical review. 
European review of social psychology, 12(1), 1-36.
Sunstein, C. R. (2016). People prefer system 2 nudges (kind of). Duke Law Journal, 66, 
121-168.
Thaler, R. H., & Sunstein, C. R. (2003). Libertarian paternalism. The American Economic 
Review, 93(2), 175-179.
Thaler, R. H., & Sunstein, C. R. (2008). Nudge: Improving Decisions about Health, Wealth, and 
Happiness. Yale University Press.
Webb, T. L., & Sheeran, P. (2006). Does changing behavioral intentions engender behavior 
change? A meta-analysis of the experimental evidence. Psychological bulletin, 132(2), 249.
BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION
Natalie Gold is a Senior Research Fellow in the Philosophy Department at Oxford 
University and a Principal Behavioural Insights Advisor at Public Health England. Her 
research area is behavioural decision making, and she does both theoretical and empirical 
work, including laboratory experiments and randomized controlled trials. She has 
published on topics including framing, moral judgements and decision, cooperation and 
coordination, self-control, and trust in finance.
